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As grand strategies go, the 2016 EU 
Global Strategy is a good document. It 
defines the vital interests of the Union, 
outlines the principles according to 
which the EU will act, and sets five clear 
priorities that constitute an agenda for 
action. If we want the EU to continue on 
the course charted by the Global Strategy, 
we will have to review the Global 
Strategy. Once the new Commission is in 
place following the May 2019 European 
elections, work should start on writing 
the EU Global Strategy 2020.   
 
The European External Action Service (EEAS) 
will assess the implementation of the Global 
Strategy since it was presented to the European 
Council in June 2016. That assessment would be 
an excellent starting point for the 2020 edition 
of the Global Strategy. There at least three reasons 
why a strategic review is necessary.    
1. A NEW HIGH REPRESENTATIVE    
No politician, newly arrived in office, likes to 
reply, when asked what his or her priorities will 
be: I will continue to implement the programme 
that was launched by my predecessor (even 
though, on occasion, that would be a very good 
idea). A strategic review will give the next High 
Representative and Vice-President of the 
Commission (HR/VP) the chance to voice his 
or her own priorities, and to shape EU external 
action accordingly. Otherwise, the risk is that 
the new HR/VP will not feel ownership of the 
Strategy, might therefore not press for its 
implementation, and at the same time introduce 
his or her own priorities through other channels. 
That could undermine the sense of purpose and 
strategic direction that a complex foreign policy 
machinery such as the EU strongly needs. An 
early review by the new HR/VP, on the 
contrary, would ensure that as little time as 
possible would be lost in the transition.  
 
2. A REGULAR AND SYSTEMATIC REVIEW   
In any case, if the EU does not review the Global 
Strategy after the 2019 elections, then when will 
it? The EU does not yet have a system to ensure 
a regular review of its grand strategy. Absent a 
settled procedure, whether or not a strategic 
review takes place depends on circumstances 
and, of course, consensus between the Member 
States. The experience of the EU’s first grand 
strategy, the 2003 European Security Strategy, 
teaches that in practice this may lead to a refusal 
to engage with strategy. A botched attempt at a 
strategic review in 2007-8 only produced a Report 
on the Implementation of the European Security 
Strategy, which was soon forgotten – and rightly 
so. Afterwards, many of those involved seemed 
to have developed an allergic reaction to 
strategy. As we now know, it would last until 2016 
before the Global Strategy was finally presented.  
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Obviously, no strategic document remains valid 
for 13 years. A strategy that cannot be touched 
no longer is a strategy but a dogma. The risk of 
blindly adhering to a dogma is that one day one 
will wake up and notice that one has been 
completely overtaken by events – and by other 
powers. A regular and systematic strategic review 
is a necessity therefore. Logically, this would take 
place every European legislature, after the 
elections, just like at the national level (at least in 
those states that have a national security strategy 
or white paper). A strategic review every five 
years is none too soon. Even though this once 
only four years will have elapsed since the Global 
Strategy was published, more than enough has 
happened to justify a review. Think only of the 
election of Donald Trump and his subsequent 
actions, and the fallout of Brexit – and that’s just 
mentioning our allies (or “allies”).  
 
A regular and systematic review requires a regular 
and systematic procedure, and a shorter 
timeline. An assessment of the current Strategy 
by the outgoing HR/VP at the end of her term 
could become a permanent feature. The first 
European Council after the elections (in June 
2019, in this case) could give a mandate to her 
eventual successor to present the next edition of 
the Strategy in June 2020. 
 
The next HR/VP could design a procedure that 
is lighter than the one used to draft the 2016 
edition, while maintaining its essential features. 
A small drafting team, to start with, including at 
least one expert from outside the EU institutions 
(who could even be the main penholder, as Dr 
Nathalie Tocci was for the current Global Strategy). 
Intense consultation with Member States is a 
second key feature. That consultation should 
again focus on substance rather than on precise 
wording, inviting ideas rather than amendments 
(and avoiding tedious discussions about dots 
and commas). Finally, input from the academic 
world should be gathered. If it is based on a 
substantial input paper from the drafting team 
(though not necessarily a full draft text), a single 
well-organised seminar can suffice. 
 
The subtitle of every subsequent document may 
vary, but the title can be kept. Global Strategy 
captures exactly what we are talking about: a 
grand strategy, covering all dimensions of 
power, and addressing the world. 
 
3. FINETUNING OR REORIENTING  
Not every strategic review necessarily leads to a 
major overhaul of strategy. The point is that not 
changing the main orientations of one’s strategy 
should be a conscious decision based on careful 
analysis, and not the result of inertia or internal 
blockages (as happened in the EU between 2003 
and 2016). Today’s Global Strategy requires 
finetuning rather than overhauling. The five 
priorities that it outlines remain valid: the 
security of Europe itself, a stable neighbourhood, 
an integrated approach to conflict, cooperative 
regional orders, and effective global governance. 
Implementation has not advanced equally far on 
all of these, however. 
 
 In the defence field, for example, things are 
moving since the activation of Permanent 
Structured Cooperation and the creation of the 
European Defence Fund. Member States must 
now use these instruments to the full in order to 
achieve the objective of strategic autonomy that 
the Global Strategy introduced. But the EU has 
yet to define what strategic autonomy means 
exactly (as I discussed in Fighting for Europe): that 
could be one task for the Global Strategy 2020. 
Which responsibilities is Europe willing to 
assume as a security and defence actor, alone if 
necessary? Once our partners as well as our 
adversaries take that into account in their 
decision-making, we will have become a true 
strategic actor.  
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The current Global Strategy also introduced 
resilience as an objective, for the neighbouring 
countries of the EU, but it is not clear whether in 
practice this has made any great difference in the 
way the EU deals with them. In this area, a 
thorough assessment of implementation could 
guide the finetuning, or a degree of reorientation, 
of policy in the Global Strategy 2020.  
 
A theme that is implicit throughout the Global 
Strategy is the return of great power rivalry, 
aggravated by a sense of the fraying of Europe’s 
alliance with the US, still the most powerful of 
the great powers. The EU will have to take an 
explicit decision on its stance, especially with 
regard to the role of China and the future of the 
rules-based order. The American position is 
clear: across party lines, China is seen as an 
adversary that must be prevented from 
overtaking the US as the leading power. 
Washington is increasing the pressure on the 
EU to follow suit and adopt a more 
confrontational line.  
 
The Global Strategy 2020 could enshrine a much 
more sophisticated strategy of engagement (as I 
advocate in 1919-2019: How to Make Peace Last?). 
The EU Member States should unite to maintain 
their sovereignty against all foreign attempts at 
subversion, making the EU strong enough to 
push back against China and other powers 
where it must, but to cooperate whenever it can, 
along the lines of the recommendations by the 
European Commission in its 12 March 2019 
communication EU-China - A Strategic Outlook.    
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The impetuousness of Donald Trump often 
pushes the EU (and other actors) into a reactive 
mode. At the same time, several governments 
within the EU willingly subvert EU foreign 
policy, toning down or blocking EU positions at 
the behest of foreign powers. Yet all of these 
governments are fully aware that their countries 
need the EU at the same time, for economic 
reasons, but also in specific areas of foreign, 
security and defence policy. A strategic review 
after the May 2019 elections would be a chance 
to craft a proactive agenda: a package deal, 
focusing on a small number of priorities, with 
something in it for every Member State. A 
strong HR/VP could negotiate that package and 
forge a mandate for him- or herself.  
 
A good strategy is not a panacea – it is just a 
starting point. But does anyone think that the 
EU will do better with a bad strategy, or even 
without strategy at all?    
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